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INTRODUCTION
SARJ
PORTSTBD
Allows continuous orbital-rate sun-tracking of the 
outboard trusses and their solar arrays
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Starboard SARJ Drive Motor Current; Start-up to Failure
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Starboard SARJ Outer Canted Surface Damage and Debris
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Starboard SARJ Datum A Surface Damage Initiated
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Port SARJ looked pristine.
But note berm of grease which 
had exuded from the TBA 
rollers interior onto the race.
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The ISS SARJ: STBD Failure Root Cause
The kinematics of mechanism requires that roller thrust loads be 
controlled to ensure stable roller line-contact with the race ring 
surface.
 Inadequate lubrication resulted in stresses within the nitride case 
and at the case/core interface, instead of within the race ring 
core.
These stresses resulted in brittle fracture and spalling of the 
nitride case.
Residual magnetic character in spalled fragments caused them 
to be retained in the mechanism (micro-gravity environment), 
leading to additional high point-loading events and a cascading 
failure of most of the nitride layer.
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The ISS SARJ: Design Boundary Conditions
 The sole design means of friction control between the race ring and 
TBA rollers was 1500-2000Å of gold on the rollers.
 Grease would be the typical lubricant for nitrided stainless steels 
under high-load mechanism conditions.
 A perceived need to avoid grease, reducing contamination potential 
for EVA crew drove the design approach!
– This constraint was never documented in the system requirements.
 We saved the Port SARJ and recovered the Starboard SARJ by 
applying grease to the race ring and allowing the TBAs to distribute it.
– No one, including EVA Crew Systems, expressed any concerns about the 
use of grease with the SARJ.
 M&P Lessons Learned
– Be critical of design approaches which go outside of typical experience.
– Assure contamination control constraints are documented, with rationale.
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The ISS SARJ: The Need for Nitriding
Nitriding was required to harden the bull-gear teeth for the pinion 
drive mechanism.
However, nitriding was also applied to the TBA roller contact 
surfaces of the race ring, to force mechanical wear within the 
mechanism to the TBAs (which were designed to be replaceable 
by EVA).
 This was done without recognizing that the sole lubrication for the 
race ring-to-roller contact was now located on a sacrificial surface.
 Nitriding the roller contact areas of the race ring added significant 
manufacturing complexity.
 During starboard SARJ failure, 150 micron surface loss was observed 
and yet operation was entirely recoverable.
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The ISS SARJ: The Need for Nitriding
The Starboard SARJ function was recovered, after losing 150 µm 
(0.006 inch) from the outer canted race ring surface.
The need for nitriding the race ring is not substantiated, as the 
mechanism can obviously tolerate a great deal of race ring wear.
 M&P Lesson Learned
– Be mindful of the unintended consequences of “make it better” decisions in 
design.
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Nitrided 15-5 PH Fragment from the Starboard SARJ, imaged in cross section. Much of this particle 
separated at or near the case core interface, and is up to 150 µm (0.006 inch) thick.
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Metallographic re-examination of Nitride Control Coupons identified intergranular
networking, well in excess of requirements, and the presence of separations.
15-5PH Core
Epoxy 
Mount
Nitride 
Case
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The ISS SARJ: Discontinuous Intergranular
Separations (DIGS)
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Polished metallographic sample exhibiting DIGS. 
The degree of porosity and the type scaffolding 
structure remaining inside each DIGS varies and at 
times appears as a nanostructure.
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The ISS SARJ: Quality of the Nitride
The original metallographic examination of nitride control 
coupons, processed with the flight hardware, did not correctly 
identify the extent of intergranular networking – in excess of 
engineering control limits.
Additionally, the coupon examinations did not detect the 
presence of DIGS.
 Even though not specifically controlled by engineering, the presence 
of these crack initiation sites within the nitride structure is an obvious 
issue.
 It appears that the DIGS were obscured by the metallographic 
mounting and polishing technique.
 M&P Lesson Learned
– Be critical of metallography, and assure that best practices are used to avoid 
distortion or obscuration of features.
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The ISS SARJ: Qualification Test Conditions
Setting up the Pinion Life Test (PLT), which was also used for 
TBA/race ring life qualification.
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The ISS SARJ: Qualification Test Results
Post-test inspection of TBA rollers, showing wear debris caked to 
the roller chamfered edge – suggesting the presence of a 
conglomerating agent.
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The ISS SARJ: Qualification Testing
Qualification testing of long-life, complex mechanisms is highly 
contentious, and expense/schedule will impact the test conditions 
selected.
 The ISS PLT was conducted in air and at 186X autotracking speed.
Post test results indicate that friction was being controlled by 
inadvertent leakage of oil/grease from within the TBA rollers, but 
this was not recognized at the time.
Successful completion of the PLT mislead the system managers.
 M&P Lessons Learned
– Bring critical thinking to the decision process for determination of qualification 
testing conditions.
– Assess the qualification test results closely, looking for artifacts induced by the 
conditions of test.
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The ISS SARJ: Hardware Storage Controls
Flight spare TBA roller with 
gold loss, and additional gold 
loss as a result of carbon tape 
testing.
The gold surfaces where the 
adhesion failed were examined 
by SEM, shown on next slide.
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Flight TBA roller with gold loss, 
accepted as-is, based on the 
successful PLT test.
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The ISS SARJ: Gold Adhesion Loss
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The ISS SARJ: Hardware Storage Controls
 It was demonstrated that the 440C roller surfaces re-oxidize with 
time under normal terrestrial conditions, undercutting the gold 
coating and causing complete loss of adhesion.
Although adhesion loss on rollers was observed on hardware 
preflight, the successful PLT test (where no gold remained on 
roller surfaces) was used to accept the condition.
 It was not recognized that gold adhesion was critical to friction 
control in the mechanism during flight.
 M&P Lessons Learned
– Spacecraft hardware must often be designed considering the terrestrial 
environment, in addition to the space environment.
– Consider a more robust approach to accommodate the ground environment 
or the exposure to unexpected conditions.
– Look for finishes sensitivity, which may require environmental controls.
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SUMMARY
 Robustness of Design in Lubricated Systems
– Difficult to quantify;
– Typically increases cost;
– Easier said than done!
 First choice in lubrication approach should be within typical 
experience for the materials and loads involved.
– If not, insist the program/system document why.
 Participate in the definition of system life test conditions and 
look hard at the results.
 Learn from our hard lessons.
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